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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2463
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2046
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 1245
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 1069
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1918
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1178
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

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AND NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2029
TAGS: [AEMR](#) [ASEC](#) [CASC](#) [KWBG](#) [PTER](#) [EG](#)
SUBJECT: FULL EAC MEETING, MAY 18, 2009

REF: A. STATE 50245
[1](#)B. CAIRO 329
[1](#)C. CAIRO 810

Classified By: William Stewart, A/DCM, reasons 1.4(b), (c), (d)

[1](#)1. (C/NF) The acting DCM convened a full Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting in response to ref A, to review potential security implications for USG interests in Egypt resulting from the possible release of photographs of detainees, and to discuss the impending release of Egyptian wage reviews, and the determination of essential personnel in the event of a pandemic in Egypt. Representatives from OMC, DAO, NAMRU, RSO, ORA, LEGATT, DEA, ICE, RMO, CONS, MGT, PAO, FCS, FAS, ECPO, USAID and LOC were present.

[1](#)2. (C/NF) The A/DCM began the meeting by eliciting comments and discussion on ref A. EAC agreed that the impact of any release of photos of detainees would be negligible, and have little effect on the security posture of the USG interests in Egypt.

[1](#)3. (SBU/NF) The EAC also briefly discussed the potential impact on morale of the recent decision to raise LES salaries by 3.9% in light of the recent GOE salary hike of 10%. It was agreed that the wage hikes would have little impact on the security of the Embassy.

[1](#)4. (C/NF) With the continuing threat of H1N1 Swine flu pandemic in Egypt, the EAC agreed it should create a list of "essential" personnel, i.e., personnel who are essential to the operation of the Embassy and providing required services in the event of a pandemic in Egypt in which Embassy personnel are requested to shelter in place. The A/DCM suggested that the drawdown list be used as a starting point, but reminded members that essential personnel would be only those personnel needed to maintain limited operations at the Embassy, and would thus be the first to receive Tamiflu if needed. ECPO added that the Embassy would not be evacuating in the event of a pandemic, but Embassy personnel would be instructed to shelter in place, which the RMO echoed. It was also stressed that collection of information for the preparation of the essential personnel list should be kept as confidential as possible to preclude anxiety or panic. A/DCM requested that section heads have the list of essential list by COB 19 May, 2009.

15. (S/NF) GRPO stated that there are no specific threats against the US Embassy or US interests at this time, but as always, there are bad people in Egypt who want to do bad things. GRPO also mentioned that an analytical link had been established between the recent bombings in Cairo; at the Khan el Khalili on February 22, 2009 (ref B) and el Azra church, May 10, 2009 (ref C): similar materials and modus operandi were used in both instances, but there is still no definite link between the events despite reported arrests, on May 18, 2009, of suspects associated with the bombings. However, in light of the announcement of the upcoming visit by POTUS, the Embassy should assume the terrorists consider the next few weeks as a viable hunting season - a successful attack would have a greater impact due to the proximity of the POTUS visit.

SCOBAY